Introduction
On 11 June 2005, the Financial Times published an interesting cartoon that nicely captures some of the issues that have played a role in the debate on climate change all along. The comic, published well before Hurricane Katrina shook the United States, shows President George W. Bush standing on a lecturn amidst a rising tide. The notes in front of him say 'climate change research', and show many crossed words; also 'possible' and 'not'. On the background we see melting ice caps and smoking oil refineries. The cartoon clearly illustrates the different perceptions and views about the problem of climate change, with those who emphasise the bad situation due to global warming, that include more floodings and melting ice caps, and the impact of industrial activity in this process. We also see a representative of those who are not so convinced about the evidence and plead for more research. Opinions about the best policy responses to climate change has diverged likewise, from those who support the Kyoto Protocol, or even think it does not go far enough, to those who see this as undesirable and stress the negative economic consequences, at the macro and/or micro level.
Almost around the same time, in the second half of 2005, British Petroleum started an advertising campaign in the Financial Times. One of the adverts, entitled "It's time to turn up the heat on climate change", read "In 1997 we became the first major energy company to publicly acknowledge the need to take steps against climate change. Since 2001, the reduction in emissions from our energy efficiency projects has now reached over 4 million tons. Over the next 4 years, we plan to implement new projects to reduce emissions by another 4 million tons." This was part of the Beyond Petroleum campaign, initially launched by the company in July 2000, together with this new sunflower logo. Interestingly enough, at the time this new BP logo and the 'Beyond Petroleum' campaign was ridiculed within the oil industry and by NGOs. It inspired the NGO Corporate Watch to think about more appropriate phrases for the company's re-branding: 'British Petroleum: Beyond Pompous, Beyond Protest, Beyond Pretension, Beyond Preposterous, Beyond Platitudes, Beyond Posturing, Beyond Presumptuous, Beyond Propaganda Beyond Belief…' (Kolk and Levy 2001) . Internally, inside BP, the slogan led to confusion and dissatisfaction because it threatened to hamper the company's core activities and business units' daily operations. At the 2001 annual meeting, management retracted the original message by emphasising that it was not meant to show the company's intention to retreat from oil. As its CEO John Browne pointed out 'Beyond Petroleum just means that we are giving up the old mindset, the old thinking that oil companies had to be dirty, secretive and arrogant'. But at this meeting he also departed from previous positive expectations about the size of future markets for renewables, and said that renewables could not even begin to substitute for oil on present conditions (Kolk and Levy 2001) . So you can imagine that I was a bit surprised to see this campaign logo and slogan coming back at full speed a few years later.
Together, these two items from the Financial Times sketch the full range of interesting aspects related to climate change. It is a very fascinating topic, and one in which dilemmas of environmental policy and of corporate responses come to the fore most prominently. It is also an area where you can clearly see the importance of interactions between a variety of stakeholders, and how the development of an issue, from emergence to maturity, is accompanied by different corporate responses. So for those of us interested in what business does, which economic factors play a role in the environment, this is an ideal topic to study. I have been intrigued by this whole complex of actors, responses and interactions since the middle of the 1990s, when policy making seemed to become more serious, and companies started to pay increasingly more attention to what was going on. In this contribution, I will give an overview of the research I have done in this period of almost a decade, which has focused on multinationals (MNCs). In this way, I also give some insight into developments over the years, and mention some promising areas for further research. Part of the earlier research that I will refer to has been done together with David Levy, and in more recent years in cooperation with Jonatan Pinkse.
Climate change is one of the environmental issues that has increasingly attracted business attention in the course of the 1990s. Multinationals have developed different strategies over the years, initially more political, non-market in nature, but currently also market-oriented. Since 1995, multinationals' political positions have gradually changed from opposition to climate measures to a more proactive approach or a 'wait-and-see' attitude, and many have started to take steps to be prepared to deal with regulation, or to go beyond that, considering risks and opportunities. A range of aspects has played a role in companies' response to climate change, at the country and sector levels, but also firm-specific and issue-specific characteristics.
Policy developments
Obviously, policy-making processes and outcomes, both nationally and internationally, have been very important, and have attracted much attention over the years. One of the things that I always discussed with students in the 1990s was what shaped countries' positions in the climate negotiations (a range of economic, geographical and political factors, see Kolk 2000 for an overview), and also how these were subject to change. An overview of policy developments since the early 1990s demonstrates how much has taken place (table 1). An important milestone in the process, which set many things in motion, has been the 1997 adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. The European Commission proposed in 1992 a carbon tax that would raise prices of fossil and nuclear energy by 50%. The proposal was conditional on the introduction of a similar tax by the US and Japan. In 1995 a carbon tax was proposed without this condition. Both proposals failed because several EU countries refused to accept the tax. 1997 Kyoto Protocol (COP 3)
Agreement on reduction targets for greenhouse gases compared to 1990 levels, to be reached in 2008-2012. Differentiated targets per country/region, e.g. Australia +8%; Canada -6%; Japan -6%; Russia 0%; US -7%; EU -8%. EU overall target translated into specific ones for member countries, e.g. Germany -21%, France 0%, Italy -6.5%, Spain +15%, UK -12.5%. 
Political responses
At the sector level, many changes have also taken place. Particularly in the period leading to the Kyoto Protocol, controversies between opponents and proponents of climate policy intensified. Before individual companies starting to take positions, a main channel for expressing views was sector-wise, by trade and industry associations, or broader national or international coalitions. Sector characteristics have been important to climate issues, especially in the stage in which negotiations take place to determine the severity and specific contents of policies (Kolk 2000) . Objections to drastic or quick measures used to be raised by energyintensive sectors such as coal, oil, steel, aluminium, chemicals, automobiles, and paper and pulp. Particularly many US MNCs joined lobby organisations, which included the Global Climate Coalition and the Coalition for Vehicle Choice. More offensive voices could be found in those sectors where this position appeared to offer new market chances or where the risks of climate change predominated. These included solar and wind energy, gas, environmental technology, telecommunications, nuclear energy, insurance and banks. Their views were represented by organisations such as the Business Council for Sustainable Energy, the Pew Center on Global Climate Change and E7 (Kolk 2001) .
After the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, the opponents lost momentum, and an increasing number of MNCs left defensive organisations, sometimes even joining offensive associations. Remarkable in particular were MNCs that first broke away from more traditional sector behaviour, such as BP, Shell, General Motors and Toyota. By mid-1999, I compiled a list of those Fortune 500 companies that had explicitly expressed their views in favour of climate measures (around 50 companies had done that), usually underlined by the fact that they joined one of the more offensive organisations such as the ones mentioned above. At that time, an interesting change was already taking place.
It was also then that we started to analyse in more detail why and how companies change, resulting in a more detailed study that came up with the following sets of factors (see table 2). And you see here that a range of aspects has played a role in companies'responses to climate change, at the country and sector levels, but there are also firm-specific and issue-specific characteristics. Source: Kolk and Levy 2004, p 178 What struck us at the time were obviously the divergent responses between multinationals in the US compared to Europe, something which you can still see to some extent if you compare, for example, Exxon Mobil and BP. We thus did an in-depth study of the oil industry to investigate this further (Levy and Kolk 2002) . We posited that there were forces that would lead to convergence of oil multinationals' positions across the Atlantic, regardless of their nationality, particularly their location in global industries and the participation in the 'global issue arena' of climate change. At the same time, their different home-country institutional contexts as well as individual company characteristics were pressures for divergence, for different views. Applied to the oil and automobile industries, it turned out that divergent pressures initially dominated, but that convergence increased as the issue matured. Managerial perceptions and institutional frames were important in shaping multinationals' responses. For companies, the issue of climate change continues to be characterised by diversity in policy developments and uncertainty as to the (potential) impact on markets, technologies and organisations. At the policy level, there has been fragmentation about approaches on how to implement Kyoto (if at all). The most notable regulatory development has been the introduction of the EU emission trading scheme per January 2005. This is the only compulsory trading system, in addition to a number of voluntary ones (including the Chicago Climate Exchange). To influence these and other initiatives to their favour, multinationals have continued to engage in political strategies, although the specific types have changed as a result of the different context . It is also interesting to observe that the climate change issue has developed further, and experienced a 'secondary trigger', beyond the 'maturity' we found in our earlier work (Kolk and Levy 2004; Levy and Kolk 2002) . Multinationals are also actively helping to shape the institutions that are emerging to govern climate change, that is the market mechanisms, particularly emission trading, that were created with the Kyoto Protocol, but have not been fully implemented and accepted yet .
Market responses
Perhaps even more exciting than the political strategies have been corporate market responses. There is a whole range of activities that multinationals are undertaking, ranging from simply making inventories of and measuring emissions (which is most common), to process improvements, improving products or engaging in market mechanisms, especially emission trading. This is basically a distinction between innovation or compensation, which they can do alone or in cooperation with others within or outside the supply chain (table 3). Source: Kolk and Pinkse 2005a, p. 8 Companies of course pursued different options simultaneously. Our analysis of multinationals showed that there were basically six groups with different characteristics (Kolk and Pinkse 2005a) : cautious planners (31%, score low on all dimensions); emergent compensators (36%, internal focus, particularly box 2); comprehensive compensators (14%, which combine targets, control and production process improvements, boxes 1, 2, 4 & 6); vertical explorers (10%, supplychain oriented, boxes 3 & 4); horizontal explorers (5%, markets beyond current scope, box 5); and emission traders (4%, boxes 2 and 6).
The sort of profile that companies have is to some extent shaped by the sector in which they operate. Automobile and oil multinationals focus, for example, mostly on developing technological capabilities (Kolk and Pinkse 2008) . In the oil industry this encompasses a range of technologies, with some targeting a range of energy sources, while others explore particularly hydrogen or renewables or stick to natural gas for the time being. In the automobile industry, Toyota was a first mover with hybrid vehicles, but most other companies now are also starting to move in this direction, although they all view it as a transition technology, and not a very profitable (even loss-making) niche market. For banks and insurance companies, organisational capabilities are more important, for example, by offering weather derivatives or facilitating/funding carbon trading or clean development/offset projects. Some oil companies are also taking steps to play a role in emission markets. General Electric, which has started a large 'Ecomagination' campaign in 2005, develops new expertise but also relies on existing ones.
Research agenda
In terms of a future research agenda, there are many areas that deserve further attention in this very turbulent and dynamic field. This involves not only following and tracing trends in corporate responses, both market and political, but also the way in which corporate realities help to shape policy development and the instruments that emerge to influence companies' behaviours. We will also assess what determines which strategies/approaches companies follow: to what extent does country of origin and location, including stakeholder pressure and regulatory situations there, sector/competitive pressures, geographical spread, degree of internationalisation, diversification and integration, product portfolio, perceptions of risks/opportunities, and other firm-specific characteristics play a role? It can again be investigated to what extent divergence or convergence is taking place, and what the performance implications of different corporate and policy approaches are.
Another important research stream is to examine how and to what extent companies implement climate approaches internally (across borders, between different subsidiaries and business units), what sorts of problems managers face in this process and whether or not climate approaches are related to 'mainstream' corporate activities. It will be interesting to see whether and how learning and knowledge transfer is taking place within companies, and in the case of multinationals from which location actual innovations (technological or organisational) originate. We also envisage studies into the actual operations and corporate drivers of engagement in carbon offset projects, particularly in developing countries, and the implications of policy contexts and governance characteristics for the extent and effectiveness of these market mechanisms.
